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THE ENTRANCE OF BANKS INTO THE
FIELD OF MUTUAL FUNDS
JOHN W. CHURCH, JR.*
RICHARD B. SEIDEL**
The banking industry has watched jealously the dramatic growth
of mutual fund assets during the past several decades.' Regulations
issued by the Federal Reserve Board, however, have prohibited banks
from engaging in activity similar to that conducted by the mutual
funds.2 Nonetheless, a realignment of regulatory powers in 1962 pro-
vided the banking industry with an opportunity to apply the invest-
ment expertise of bank trust departments to mutual fund activities.
First National City Bank of New York (Citibank) was the first bank
to avail itself of this new regulatory freedom, establishing a com-
mingled investment fund (CIF) comprised of numerous agency invest-
ment accounts. Recently however, the entrance of banks into the field
of mutual funds was at least temporarily thwarted when the United
States Supreme Court, in Investment Company Institute v. Came
held that a commingled investment fund violates Sections 16 and 21
of the Glass-Steagall Act :4 This article will analyze the ICI deci-
sion and will suggest approaches available to those banks interested in
applying the investment expertise of their trust departments to mutual
fund activities.
I. THE BACKGROUND
Mutual funds provide relatively small investors with the benefits
of expert investment advice which they could not individually afford.
The ability of banks to provide similar investment advice to small
investors is hampered by the fact that the cost of managing an account,
an expense that must be paid out of the investment income of the
account, does not decrease markedly with a decrease in account
assets.5 Accounts of less than $500,000 are subject to this inflated
4' A.B., Bowdoin College, 1954; Senior Investment Officer, Girard Bank, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
** BA., Georgetown University, 1963; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law,
1966; Member of the New York and Pennsylvania Bars; Trust Officer, Girard Bank,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1 See Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1967) (testimony of SEC Chairman Manual F. Cohen).
2 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937) ; SEC Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. § 206.10(c), .17 (1939) ; see 42 Fed.
Res. Bull. 228 (1956); 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1955) ; 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 390, 393 (1940).
3 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
4 12 U.S.C. HI 24, 378 (1970).
5 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March
9, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77332 at 82,587 (1966)
reprinted in Hearings on S. 2704, Collective Investment Funds Before a Subcomm. of the
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management cost,' and accounts of less than $200,000 do not lend
themselves to efficient independent management because the manage-
ment fees become prohibitive.? To mitigate this impediment, the bank-
ing industry turned to the common trust fund, an arrangement whereby
a number of small trust accounts is commingled and managed as a
single trust corpus.' The common trust fund thus became the vehicle
for banks wishing to expand their activities into the field of mutual
funds.'
Progress in this direction, however, was limited by Regulation F 1°
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which re-
stricted the scope of common trust fund participation to situations
involving a "bona fide fiduciary purpose."'" One writer noted that "the
practical effect of [the Board's] rulings was to prohibit banks from
offering participation in the common trust fund as a vehicle for invest-
ment.'" 2
 A proposed amendment's to these rulings, which would have
further restricted the types of trusts manageable in a common trust
fund, was forestalled by the successful banking industry effort" to
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, 83 [hereinafter cited as
1966 Hearings].
0
 This amount has been suggested as the maximum for commingling. Wolfe, Wider
Horizons for Common Trust Funds, 101 Trusts & Estates 1075, 1076 (1962).
7
 Citibank considers this the smallest managing agency account economically
acceptable. First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538
(March 9, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 177332 at 82,587
(1966), reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 81, 83; Brief of Citibank, before the
SEC at 4-5 reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 197, 200-01. The minimum may
be substantially lower outside New York City.
S 3 A. Scott, Trusts § 227.9 at 1829 (3d ed. 1967).
9
 See Comment, Banks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The Commingled Invest-
ment Fund, 115 Ti. Pa. L. Rev. 1276, 1278 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Com-
mingled Investment Fund].
10
 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937); SEC Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. § 206.10(c), .17 (1939); see 42
Fed. Res. Bull. 228 (1956); 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1955); 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 390, 393
(1940).
11
 For example, the most recent ruling provided:
Authorization of revocable trusts for common trust fund participation should be
preceded by particularly careful determination of the bona fides of their use and
purpose to avoid improper use of the common trust fund as a medium attracting
individuals primarily seeking investment management of their funds.
42 Fed. Res. Bull. 228 (1956).
12
 Comment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 9, at 1278.
19
 25 Fed. Reg. 12479 (1960). The amendment would have provided:
The funds of an inter vivos trust revocable by the settlor and providing for the
payment of the principal of the trust to the settlor's estate at his death may not
be invested in a Common Trust Fund established and maintained under this
section.
Id. The form of trust which this amendment would have prohibited is "well-suited to do
little more than obtain financial management services for its beneficiary-owner." Com-
ment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 9, at 1279.
14 See Hearings on H.R. 12577 & 12825 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
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transfer regulatory authority of the trust powers of national banks
to the Comptroller of the Currency." Under this newly acquired au-
thority, the Comptroller proposed to amend Regulation 9 1° (the suc-
cessor to Regulation F) by deletion of the requirement of a "bona fide
fiduciary purpose,"" thereby permitting "a common trust fund main-
tained by the bank exclusively for the collective investment and re-
investment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as
managing agent. . . ."" The proposed revision prompted the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue to question the applicability of the pass-
through treatment accorded common trust funds by Section 584 of the
Internal Revenue Code." A ruling by the Internal Revenue Service
that the CIF monies must be "received by the bank in trust" 2° in order
for the fund to qualify for Section 584 treatment was acquiesced to
by the Comptroller and Regulation 9 was revised accordingly. 21
IL THE DECISION IN Investment Company Institute v. Camp
In 1965, pursuant to revised Regulation 9, the First National
City Bank of New York submitted a plan for the establishment of a
collective investment fund. 22 Citibank apparently encountered some
difficulty with "[t]he concept of a managing agent holding funds in
Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962) (statement of F. A. Gunther on
behalf of the American Bankers Association).
12
 Authority was transferred by the Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76
Stat. 668, codified at 12 U.S.C. I 92a (1970).
le 28 Fed, Reg. 1111 (1963).
17 Compare 27 Fed. Reg. 9764, 9767 (1962), promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 917 (which
superseded 12 C.F.R. iE 206 without substantive change) with 28 Fed. Reg. 3309, 3311
(1963), promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 918. The "bona fide fiduciary purpose" requirement had
been the cause of some confusion. The Federal Reserve Board maintained that "trusts
created and used for bona fide fiduciary purposes are to be distinguished from trusts
created by individuals primarily seeking the benefits to be derived from corporate
fiduciary investment management." 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1955). However, Comptroller
Saxon stated that "[n]o one has ever been able satisfactorily to explain that term to
me. ... The net effect of this vague term has been to introduce a great amount of legal
and practical uncertainty." Common Trust Funds—Overlapping Responsibility and
Conflict in Regulation, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearing"
18 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (a)(3) (1971).
12
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, { 584 (b).
20 Rev. Rul. 64-59, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 193-94.
21 29 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964). See 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 599 for a compari-
son of Regulation 9 as originally adopted and the current version as amended in response
to Rev. Rul. 64-59.
22
 For other descriptions of the Citibank plan, see The Mutual Fund Industry: A
Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732, 868-70 (1969); Brief of Citibank, before the
SEC at 4, reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 197, 200; First National City Bank,
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 77332 (1966), reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 81.
1177
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
trust,' because the bank sought and obtained an exemption from
this requirement." The Citibank plan was approved by the Comp-
troller' and, in 1966, Citibank registered the fund with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in accordance with the Investment
Company Act of 1940; 26
 Citibank also filed a registration statement
with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933." The fund was
to be managed through the bank's Trust Investment Division. Three
of the five members of the managing committee were to be Citibank
officers." Under the plan, customers would designate the bank as their
23
 Comment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 9, at 1280 n.26 (emphasis in
original).
24
 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 1965, at 6, col. 2.
25
 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 622 (1971).
26 15 U.S.C. El 80a-1 at seq. (1970). The banking industry claims an exemption
under { 3 (c) (3) of the Act, which exempts "any common trust fund or similar fund
maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of
moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, adminis-
trator, or guardian . . . ." 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(3) (1970). The SEC has insisted that
this exemption is inapplicable. See 1963 Hearing, supra note 17, at 4-5, 9 (statement of
William L. Cary, Chairman of the SEC). The legislative history of this section makes it
clear that the actively promoted CIF contemplated by Regulation 9 is not the passive
common trust fund of the 1930's, which the section was intended to exempt. Note,
Commingled Investment Accounts: Banks v. Securities Industry, 45 Notre Dame Lawyer
746, 776 (1970).
27 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (1970). The SEC also maintained that this Act was
applicable, 1963 Hearing supra note 17, at 4, 9 (statement of William L. Cary, Chairman
of the SEC). The Comptroller dissented strongly. Id. at 162-64 (statement of James J.
Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency). Citibank apparently chose to bear the expenses of
registration rather than contest the issue with the SEC. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26,
1965, at 6, col. 2. See Note, Commingled Investment Accounts: Banks v. Securities Indus-
try, 45 Notre Dame Lawyer 746, 781-90 (1970).
28 Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits the simultaneous employment of
any person by a bank and an organization "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail ... of stocks, bonds, or
other similar securities...." 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). Although the term "securities" is not
defined by the Act, it has been suggested "that officers of the bank might be deemed to
be working for both the bank and the CIF, and, further, that the sale of participations
might constitute the issuance, underwriting or distribution of securities..." in violation of
the Act. Comment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 9, at 1292. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 218.101 (1971). Citibank requested an interpretation from the Federal Reserve Board.
Interpreting § 32 as only prohibiting employment by two separate entities, the Board
viewed Citibank and its CIF as a single entity, the CIF being nothing more than a
department of the bank, and concluded that § 32 would not be violated. The ruling is
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 218.111 (1971). Compare 12 C.F.R. § 218.101 (1971). The
Supreme Court found this approach reasonable. 401 U.S. at 625 n.12. While this ruling
allowed Citibank employees to serve as employees of the CIF, § 10(c) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 prohibited a majority of an investment company's board from
serving as officers or directors of any one bank—limiting to 2 the number of Citibank
officers who could serve on the CIF's board. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1970). Citibank
requested an exemption from this requirement. The SEC granted the exemption so that,
under § 10(a) of the Act, Citibank officers could comprise a maximum of 60% of the
CIF's board or, in this case, 3 of the 5 man board. However, Citibank was not allowed
to avail itself of § 10(d), which would have allowed 4 of the CIF's 5 man board to be
affiliated with the bank because of the bank's inability to register as an investment
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agent and deposit a minimum of $10,000 into a common investment
pool. All monies collected were to be invested and managed by the
managing committee as one account, each individual investor, in turn,
receiving "units of participation" which could be purchased or re-
deemed at specified intervals. 2 °
The Investment Company Institute (ICI), an association of open-
end investment companies," sought a declaratory judgment invalidat-
ing Regulation 9. 81
 ICI challenged the authority of the Comptroller to
issue the revised regulation and directly attacked the Citibank plan.
ICI claimed that the fund's activities would be in direct violation of
the Glass-Steagall Act" and argued that, since no true fiduciary pur-
pose existed, the bank could not commingle its customers' accounts."
The Comptroller answered that the fund did involve a true fiduciary
relationship and that the units of participation were not securities
within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act.' The District Court for
adviser under § 10(d)(2). First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 77,332 at 82,588-92 (1966), reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 84-88. For a
complete treatment of the exemption issue, see Comment, Commingled Investment Fund,
supra note 9, at 1299-1306. The propriety of these exemptions was at issue in the
companion case of National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
However, because the Court resolved ICI on the basis of the Glass-Steagall Act's pro-
hibitions, the Court did not reach the issue concerning the propriety of the exemptions
granted by the SEC.
29 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538
(March 9, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rev. 11 77,332 at 82,586
(1966), reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 82.
80 ICI is a national association representing 177 mutual funds and their 88 investment
advisers, and 78 principal underwriters. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,
420 F.2d 83, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1969). As of April 17, 1972, ICI membership had increased to
370 mutual funds, 166 investment advisers and 125 principal underwriters. Letter from
Robert L. Augenblick, President, Investment Company Institute, to the Boston College
Industrial and Commercial Law Review, April 17, 1972.
81 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 627 (1967). For a complete
treatment of the standing of the ICI to challenge this regulation see Comment, Standing:
Suits Against Federal Regulatory and Administrative Agencies—Investment Company
Institute v. Camp, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 289 (1971).
82 Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified passim in 12 U.S.C.). See
Statement of Joseph E. Welsh of the Investment Company Institute, 1966 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 63.
88
 12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (1971) is designed to prevent any purchases by a bank when it
has an interest which might improperly affect its judgment. A bank is prohibited from
having "any interest in such fund other than in its fiduciary capacity. . . ." 12 C.F.R.
§ 9.18(b) (8) (i) (a) (1971). See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a); Comment, Commingled
Trust Funds and Variable Annuities: Uniform Federal Regulation of Investment Funds
Operated by Banks and Insurance Companies, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 442-43 (1968). Cf.
the Federal Reserve Board's repeated rulings that participations or shares in mutual
funds are securities for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act, and the Board's similar charac-
terization of units of participation in a bank-sponsored CIF. 27 Fed. Res. Bull. 399
(1941); 37 Fed. Res. Bull. 645 (1951); 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 1637 (1965).
34 401 U.S. at 627 n.13. See Hearings on H.R. 8599 & 4410 Before the Subcomm. on
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the District of Columbia ruled that the relationship between the bank
and an individual fund participant was an agency rather than a.trust
relationship." The fund was therefore held to be beyond the scope of
fiduciary powers which the Comptroller could authorize." Moreover,
the court found that the units of participation in the fund were securi-
ties which Citibank, as a national bank, was prohibited from selling
under Sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act." The Comptroller
and Citibank appealed from this decision.
The appeal was consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit with a petition filed by the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD). The NASD had sought review of
an SEC order which partially exempted Citibank from certain provi-
sions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The court of appeals
reversed the district court decision and affirmed the SEC order." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases."
The Supreme Court held that the operation of a commingled in-
vestment fund, comprised of agency accounts, involves a bank in the
underwriting, issuance, selling and distribution of securities in viola-
tion of Sections 16" and 2141 of the Glass-Steagall Act." The Court
apparently determined that the purchase of stock by the bank for the
CIF portfolio would not be a purchase on behalf of the individual
participant but rather a purchase for Citibank's own account, the fund
participant's interest in the purchase being an indirect one only. More-
over, the Court apparently found that the fund participations were
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1964).
85
 274 F. Supp. at 639.
$3 Id. at 640-41.
87 Id. at 642-48.
88 National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See Note, 49 Texas L. Rev. 134 (1970).
89 397 U.S. 986 (1970).
40 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association [bank] shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its
own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities
or stock ....
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
41 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970).
[lit shall be unlawful—(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, busi-
ness trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the
same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to
check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or
other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor .. .
Id.
42 401 U.S. at 639.
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securities, so that the bank was held to be engaged in the issuance,
underwriting'or distribution of securities in contravention of the Glass-
Steagall Act.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court initially observed that,
"fo]n their face, §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act appear
clearly to prohibit [the operation of a CIF] by national banks.""
The Court, however, did not reach its conclusion simply by applying
the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The Court apparently
recognized that some ambiguity might exist in the statutory language
which could justify a different, perhaps narrower, reading of the word
"security." Indeed, in application, the term, under the Securities Act .
Of 1933, has posed numerous problems. Moreover, no logical impera-
tive requires that the word be defined in the Glass-Steagall Act pre-
cisely as it is under the 1933 Act." The possibility of such ambiguity
prompted the Court to investigate the legislative history of the Act.
It is submitted that the Court's inquiry was undertaken for the
limited purpose of justifying a narrower reading of the word security
than that initially given it by the Court. The Court was not searching
for a congressional intent to include an arrangement such as the Citi-
bank fund within the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act. Moreover,
a finding of a congressional intent to include such funds within the
prohibitions of the Act was unnecessary, since Citibank's activity was
embraced within the plain meaning of the language Congress had used
to express its prohibitions. In order to justify a departure from the
ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the Court sought, but did
not find, a congressional intent to exclude from the scope of the Act's
prohibitions activity of the type engaged in by Citibank."
48 401 U.S. at 625.
44 see Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to
Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 795, 824-25 (1964). But
see Comment, Commingled Trust Funds and Variable Annuities: Uniform Federal
Regulation of Investment Funds Operated by Banks and Insurance Companies, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 435, 448-49 (1968).
45 The Court noted that:
[T]here is nothing in the phrasing of either 16 or 21 that suggests a narrow
reading of the word "securities." ..
Indeed there is direct evidence that Congress specifically contemplated that
the word "security" includes an interest in an investment fund. . . . [T]here is
reason to believe that Congress explicitly intended to prohibit a national bank
from operating an investment trust.
But, in any event, we are persuaded that the purposes for which Congress
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act leave no room for the conclusion that a par-
ticipation in a bank investment fund is not a "security" within the meaning of
the Act.
401 U.S. at 635-36. The Court further noted that "[blecause the potential hazards and
abuses that flow from a bank's entry into the mutual investment business are the same
basic hazards and abuses that Congress intended to eliminate almost 40 years ago, we
cannot but apply the terms of the federal statute as they were written." Id. at 639.
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In analyzing the legislative history, the Court noted that the
Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in response to abuses flowing from the
use by banks of "securities affiliates"" in order to engage in the un-
derwriting of speculative securities. The purpos6 of the Act was to
limit commercial banks to commercial banking—i.e., to separate them
from the investment banking industry." The Court conceded that
there were many sound arguments for allowing banks to enter the
mutual fund field, including considerations of competition, convenience
and expertise." Moreover, it may be observed that banking practices
which represented a potential for abuse in the 1930's do not necessar-
ily possess the same potential today, due to enactment of extensive
banking regulations in the interim." The Court nevertheless deter-
mined that a significant similarity existed between the potential abuses
of the Citibank commingled investment fund and those of the securi-
ties affiliates to which the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act were
directed." It would appear that this similarity prevented the Court
from finding a congressional intent to exclude from those prohibitions
an arrangement such as the Citibank fund.
The Court noted a number of potential abuses common to both
the commingled investment fund and securities affiliates:
(1) Banks might invest their own assets in frozen or other-
wise imprudent investments.'
(2) The bank and the fund would be closely associated in
the public mind and, if the fund should fare badly, pub-
lic confidence in the bank might be impaired. 52
(3) Banks could misuse their credit facilities to shore up
the fund through unsound loans or by making credit
more freely available to companies in whose stock the
fund had invested."
46 Security affiliates "enjoy fed] identity of ownership and management with the
bank, but [were] incorporated separately under State law and could freely operate as
security companies." Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 999 (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Hear-
ings]. Affiliates were to "carry on for the account of the bank's stockholders . .. the
making of an investment profit from holdings in stocks and speculative securities." 1966
Hearings, supra note 5, at 486 n.56.
47 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Senator Buckley). "If we want banking
service to be strictly banking service, without the expectation of additional profits in
selling something to customers, we must keep the banks out of the investment security
business." Id. See also 1931 Hearings, supra note 46, at 40, 237.
48 401 U.S. at 636.
46 See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Oft 77(a) at seq. (1970); the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1970); the Bank Holding
Act, 12 U.S.C. ill 1841 et seq. (1970).
60 401 U.S. at 639.
61 Id. at 630.
52 Id. at 631.
58 Id.
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(4) Bank customers could suffer losses in the fund which
could destroy goodwill and this, in turn, could "become
an important handicap to a bank during a major period
of security market inflation!" 64
(5) The banks' promotional needs might lead them to lend
their reputation for prudence and restraint to the enter-
prise of selling particular stocks and securities, and this
could not be done without that reputation being under-
cut by the risks necessarily incident to the investment
banking business."
(6) Conflicts of interest could develop between the promo-
tional interest of the investment banker and the com-
mercial banker's obligation to render disinterested in-
vestment advice."
While this enumeration of potential abuses would alone have been suf-
ficient to justify the Court's refusal to do other than "apply the terms
of the federal statute as they were written,”" it is significant that the
Court's analysis of the Act's legislative history failed to disclose any
evidence supporting the argument that commingled investment fund
participations should not be considered securities within the meaning
of the Act. To understand why the Court found that these participa-
tions should be treated as securities, it may be helpful to compare the
activity involved in the management of a commingled investment fund
with two other forms of activity, long undertaken by banks, which do
not involve dealing in securities.
The first of these two activities involves the management of an
individual agency account. The 1935 amendments to the Glass-Steagall
Act58 clearly permit a bank to manage portfolios in an agency capac-
ity; the legislative history of these amendments reinforces this con-
clusion." Furthermore, traditional interpretations of the word security
have not encompassed simple agency relationships." The second ac-
tivity involves the operation of a commingled trust fund. Trust powers
are expressly granted to national banks 01 and, under Regulation F of
54 Id., quoting from 1931 Hearings, supra note 46, at 1064.
66 401 U.S. at 632.
58 Id. at 633. A banker should not have the opportunity to influence the banks
customers in regard to investments on which he is to receive any profit. See 75 Cong,
Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
57 401 U.S. at 639.
58 See id. at 623 n.10. Banks remain prohibited from trading in securities for their
own account.
59 S. Rep. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17; H. R. Rep. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18.
99 See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep,
V 93,355 at 91,904.
61 Federal Reserve Act {I 11, 38 Stat. 261 (1913).
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the Federal Reserve Board"' the commingling of trust funds has been
practiced for at least a generation . . . consistently with the banking
laws . . . ."" It may be observed that common trust funds are spe-
cifically exempted from the statutory definition of securities given in
the Securities Act of 1933" and the Investment Company Act of
1940." Thus the traditional definition of a security and the legislative
history of the Glass-Steagall Act would both permit this second type
of activity. •
In contrast, the Court found that the type of activity involved in
the management of a commingled investment fund comes within the
prohibition of the Act. The Court suggested that although this activity
is a "union" of the permissible powers to commingle trust assets and
manage agency accounts, it nonetheless "gives birth to an investment
fund whose activities are of a different character."" While the Court
did not elucidate this point, reference to the Court's definition of a
security as set forth in SEC v. Howey" is instructive. In Howey, the
Supreme Court defined a security as a "scheme [which] involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others."" By analogy this definition protects
the banks' powers to manage agency accounts and to commingle trust
funds, since neither activity involves both the common enterprise and
the profit motive whose realization is solely dependent upon others'
efforts. The individual yet simultaneous management of several agency
accounts has been found to lack "the element of commonality."" The
operation of a common trust fund is excluded from the Howey defini-
tion because it involves a "fiduciary purpose," rather than a mere
profit or investment motive 7 0
 In fact, Regulation F of the Federal Re-
serve Board was issued because the Board of Governors believed that
such a fiduciary purpose was necessary in order to distinguish the com-
mon trust fund from a security, so that the prohibitions of the Glass-
Steagall Act would be avoided. 71 On the other hand, both of the
62
 See Report on Commingled or Common Trust Funds Administered by Banks and
Trust Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1939).
83 401 U.S. at 624.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (as amended by the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970, § 27(b), 84 Stat. 1413) (1970).
65
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1970).
66 401 U.S. at 625.
67 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
08 401 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).
as Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc. [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 93,355
at 91,902.
" See the Federal Reserve Board's repeated rulings that participations in a common
trust fund which Iack a "bona fide fidudary purpose" are securities within the meaning of
the Glass-Steagall Act. 27 Fed. Res. Bull. 399 (1941); 37 Fed. Res. Bull. 645 (1951); 49
Fed. Res. Bull. 1637 (1965).
71 See sources cited in note 70 supra.
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elements required•by the Howey definition are present in the case of a
commingled agency account. The requisite element of commonality is
present, as is - the profit or investment motive, unwed to any fiduciary
purpose. This third type of activity, then, is a hybrid whose character-
istics bring it within the Howey definition of a security.
' In his dissent, Justice Blackmun observed that the two former ac-
tivities, which the majority declined to view as involving securities,
carried a potential for abuse similar to that inherent in the third type
of activity, and hence required regulation as much as did that third
activity." Justice Blackmun then reasoned that the existence of such
similar potential for abuse in the two activities, which admittedly are
not prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act, justified exclusion of the third
type of activity from the scope of the statute. This argument misses
the point, however, and an analogy to "the Securities Act of 1933 may
be helpful. Potential for abuse may exist in arrangements outside the
securities field, for example, in such areas as real estate transactions
or consumer affairs, to which the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws are not applicable. Nevertheless, similar abuses in the securities
field are regulated by these provisions. Accordingly, the fact that in-
dividual agency accounts and commingled trust funds are not prohib-
ited does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a commingled
agency account is permitted. Rather, the traditional interpretation of
the word security leads to the conclusion that this arrangement in-
volves securities and that it is prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act
when engaged in by a national bank.
Although supported by the legislative history, the Supreme Court's
decision in ICI, holding bank activity in commingled investment funds
to be unlawful, is regrettable in light of the many benefits the investing
public would have reaped from the entrance of banks into the field of
mutual funds. One major benefit of banking industry participation in
the mutual field would have been increased competition. The expertise
which bank trust departments would have applied to the role of the
investment adviser would have raised the standards of performance
by which mutual funds are judged. Mutual fund advisers would in
turn have been forced to meet these higher performance criteria, for,
although most advisers are "locked-in" to their fund, the sales of fund
securities could reflect the adverse performance of the adviser, thus
prompting action by the directors of the investment company.
Competition in the field of mutual funds could also be manifested
in the area of sales loads. The ready availability of a no-load fund at
a local bank would likely force load funds to reduce their load charges
and to offer significantly better performance than bank-operated funds,
72 401 U.S. at 644. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in order to justify any residual load charges. Bank competition would
also put pressure on investment advisers to reduce their advisory fees,
the magnitude of which has long been subject to criticism. Further-
more, the investment advisory expertise of bank trust departments,
the stimulus for increased competition in the area of adviser's perfor-
mance and sales loads, is itself a benefit to the small investor when
applied to a mutual fund. This expertise, traditionally available only
to relatively large investors, would have become available to small
investors as well, thereby significantly expanding the small investor's
investment choices. Finally, the convenience afforded the small inves-
tor by a bank-operated mutual fund would have provided a further
significant benefit to the investing public. In light of the numerous
advantages that a commingled investment fund provides, alternative
methods of bank participation in the mutual fund field should be in-
vestigated.
III. OTHER MODES OF BANK PARTICIPATION
IN THE FIELD OF MUTUAL FUNDS
In view of the ICI decision, it would appear that banks have
available at least four approaches by which to enter the mutual fund
field. The first entails vigorous industry lobbying efforts to effect a
legislative change that would permit banks to enter the field directly,
through the vehicle of an open-end fund. As the ICI Court admitted,
there exist many sound arguments for allowing banks to enter the field
through an open-end fund; however, legislative exemption of such funds
from the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions appears necessary in light
of the decision in /C/. Lobbying for legislative reform has been sug-
gested in the past but it has not generated strong support—apparently
because of the time and expense involved." In the long run, however,
legislative reform may be the most viable alternative and the one con-
ferring the most benefit upon the small investor.
A second approach entails a more active promotion by banks of
their present "mutual" funds—i.e., the common trust fund." How-
ever, the viability of this approach depends on whether the partici-
pants in the fund are found to have a bona fide fiduciary purpose in
establishing the trust. Such a purpose is difficult to establish, however,
without the assistance of definite standards. Aggressive promotion of
73 See Comment, Banks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The Commingled
Investment Fund, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1276, 1306 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Commingled Investment Fund]; cf. Note, Commingled Investment Accounts: Banks v. Se-
curities Industry, 45 Notre Dame Lawyer 764, 807-12 (1970); Comment, Of Banks and
Mutual Funds: The Collective Investment Trust, 20 Sw. L.J. 334, 344-46 (1966).
74
 See Lovell, Trust New Business, 104 Trusts & Estates 1164 (1965); Vunderink,
Contest for Trust Business, 103 Trusts & Estates 652 (1964).
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the common trust fund may lead to the inference that the bank made
no attempt to assess the purpose of its customer. As a result, the ar-
rangement may be invalidated on its face as a violation of the Glass-
Steagall Act, despite the fact that a trust rather than an agency ac-
count is the commingled investment vehicle. Even if an arrangement
utilizing the common trust fund as a form of investment vehicle does
not on its face violate the terms of the Glass-Steagall Act, the issue is
still not resolved. Conceivably, a court could turn to the legislative
history of the Act to find a congressional intent to include such an
arrangement within the Act's prohibitions. One commentator has ob-
served that, since the Act was directed at securities affiliates, it should
matter little that the affiliate takes the form of a trust."
The foregoing discussion emphasizes the importance of using care
in constructing the common trust so that the arrangement will not be
considered a sham. This result can be accomplished most effectively
by avoiding the use of preprinted trust instruments, by not demanding
the accumulation of income, and by "selling" the fund not as an in-
vestment vehicle but as part of a total financial planning service. Al-
though these precautions would serve to counter the inference of a
sham and to promote the credibility of the arrangement as a true trust
relationship possessing a bona fide fiduciary purpose, they also make
the arrangement less profitable for the bank. An additional risk inher-
ent in this approach is the danger that banks would be accused of
overreaching by attempting to expand the scope of legislation that
permits banks to commingle trust funds."
The third approach, which may involve a type of activity outside
the scope of the Glass-Steagall Act and which, in addition, may elimi-
nate the abuses noted in ICI, is the use of "no load" closed-end funds.
Once established, the closed-end fund, unlike the open-end fund, does
not issue or redeem shares." Customarily, closed-end fund shares are
listed on leading exchanges, with prices established by willing buyers
and sellers in the same manner that prices are established for other
75 Comment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 73, at 1298.
76 "At common law there was objection to the mixture of the funds of two or more
trusts, or of trust and non-trust property, in a single investment or group of investments
because such action violated the rules about segregation and earmarking of trust property
and also involved conflicting interests and hence disloyalty." G. Bogert, Handbook, of the
Law of Trusts § 105 at 277 (4tb ed. 1963). Enabling legislation was necessary to over-
come this rule. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179 (1959). For a compilation of state
laws on this point, see Common Trust Funds--Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in
Regulation, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 169-76 (1963). This approach was successfully employed in the
past by Girard Trust Bank but the practice was discontinued when the problems
presented were found to be overwhelming.
7T See The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732,
742, 749 (1969) for a comparison of open-end and closed-end funds.
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stocks. Open-end shares, on the other hand, are mechandised by the
fund's underwriter, a practice which requires the purchaser to pay a
commission, or load charge, to the underwriter. A holder of open-end
fund shares usually sells them to the fund, which will redeem the
shares for their net asset value. This distinction between funds is re-
flected in the type of activity engaged in by the fund's management
company. In the case of an open-end fund, the management company
is constantly involved in the buying and selling of participations. On
the other hand, since a closed-end fund usually issues a fixed number
of shares through underwriters, the management company has nothing
to do with the buying or selling of participations and is only interested
in the holders from the standpoint of remitting dividends and state-
ments. Since the closed-end fund has nothing to do with the buying or
selling of participations, as General Motors has nothing to do with the
buyers and sellers of its shares, or their price, arguably the closed-end
fund would not violate the terms of the Glass-Steagall Act. It can also
be argued that the intent of Congress was not to prohibit a fund of
this type and that its potential for abuse is not a practical reality in
the 1970's. Faced with the question of the legality of such a fund, it
is possible that a court would not feel compelled to find the arrange-
ment prohibited. 78
In an interpretation issued pursuant to a revision of Regulation
Y, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has recently
stated that "the Glass-Steagall Act provisions, as interpreted by the
U.S. Supreme Court, forbid a bank holding company to sponsor, or-
ganize or control a mutual fund. However, the Board does not believe
that such restrictions apply to closed-end investment companies as
long as such companies are not primarily or frequently engaged in
the issuance, sale or distribution of securities.' Despite the confi-
dence expressed by the Federal Reserve Board, a number of questions
concerning the applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to this approach
remain unanswered. For example, if a bank were both management
company and adviser, it might still violate Section 16 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, since the bank would be buying securities for its own
account rather than for the account of the individual participant. More
importantly, a fact perhaps not considered by the Federal Reserve
Board is that even a closed-end fund would be at least initially in-
volved in the "issuance" of "securities."88 While a closed-end fund
would alleviate one of the abuses the Glass-Steagall Act sought to
78 See textual discussion of the ICI Court's rationale and the purpose for the Court's
consideration of the legislative history in ICI at pp. 1180-84 supra.
79 37 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1972).
8O See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 n.11 (1971). See also 15
U.S.C. §f 80a-2 (a) (22), -2 (a) (36), -3 (a) (1), -5 (a)(2 ).
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remedy—the constant issuing and redeeming of securities—the fund
might still violate the precise terms of the statute because the Act
makes no distinction between initial and continuing issuance. Both of
these objections are overcome by the fourth alternative.
This approach would restrict the bank to acting as an investment
adviser to an independent investment company." Clearly, this ap-
proach would avoid the problems encountered in the closed-end fund
approach since the bank would not be involved in the issuance of se-
curities nor in the buying or selling of securities for its own account.
The bank would merely provide the independent investment company
with investment advice." Furthermore, the problems of the second
approach are avoided since a trust is not involved.
In 1956, Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act,88
which permits banks to operate holding companies." Empowered to
promulgate regulations under the Act, the Federal Reserve Board on
August 17, 1971, announced a proposal to amend Section 222.4(a) (5)
of Regulation Y. 85 The amendment would permit a bank holding com-
pany to serve "as investment adviser to an investment company reg-
istered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." The Board
determined that this activity is so closely related to banking and to
the management of banks as to be a proper incident thereto," and
therefore that it is lawful activity under Section 4(c) (8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act.' This amendment was approved by the Board
effective February 1, 1972, and was accompanied by extensive inter-
pretations."
Under the Board's interpretations, a holding company may not
sell or distribute securities of any investment company for which it
acts as investment adviser; nor may it act as investment adviser to
81 Under this arrangement the bank, as investment adviser, remains distinct from
the investment company which actually issues the participations, arranges the underwrit-
ing of the issue and manages the fund's portfolio pursuant to advice received from the
investment adviser. it is dear, therefore, that the "single entity" rule of the Federal Re-
serve Board would not be applicable. In order to avoid a violation of 32 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, none of the investment company's employees could be employed by the
(investment adviser) bank.
82 Due to the separation of functions, and most particularly, to the total independence
of the investment company's board of directors from the advising bank, the abuses pos-
sible in a CIF or security affiliate are minimized. The independent investment company
would scrutinize the investment adviser's performance. At the same time, the bank would
have no greater stake in the success of the fund than in any customer's account, thus
minimizing any salesman's interest,
80
 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
84 12 U.S.C. $$ 1841 at seq. (1970).
85 36 Fed. Reg. 16695 (1971). Regulation Y, formerly 12 C.F.R. pt. 222, was re-
designated 12 C.F.R. pt. 225. 36 Fed. Reg. 21666 (1971).
80 37 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1972).
sr 12 U.S.C.	 1843(c)(8) (1970).
88 37 Fed. Reg. 1463-64 (1972).
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an investment company having a name similar to that of the holding
company or any of its subsidiary banks. Further, a holding company
may not (a) purchase for its own account securities of any investment
company for which it acts as investment adviser; (b) purchase, at
its discretion, any such securities in a fiduciary capacity; (c) extend
credit to any such investment company; nor (d) accept the securities
of any such investment company as collateral for a loan to purchase
securities of the investment company. Moreover, prospectus or sales
literature should not be distributed by the holding company, nor
should any such literature be made available to the public at any
offices of the holding company. Officers and employees of bank sub-
sidiaries should be instructed not to express any opinion with respect
to the advisability of the purchase of securities. Upon request, the
holding company may furnish bank customers the name and address
of the fund and underwriter or distributing company, but it should
not furnish the names of the customers to the fund or its distributor.
The investment adviser may not have offices in any building which is
likely to be identified with the bank holding company. Finally, the
Board has indicated that bank holding companies, except to the extent
limited by the Glass-Steagall Act, may exercise all functions custom-
arily permitted to investment advisers. 89
Under the approach contemplated by this regulation, the invest-
ment company is treated as an entity separate from the bank or bank
holding company acting as the investment adviser. In fact, the invest-
ment company would have the power to fire the adviser. The fund
would be underwritten by the investment banking community, in the
case of a closed-end fund, and sold through an agency of the invest-
ment company, in the case of an open-end fund." The fund itself
would be controlled and owned by the independent management com-
pany. The bank would not be involved in issuing or buying and selling
fund securities; nor would the bank purchase any securities for its
own account or for a commingled account; rather, the investment
company would purchase portfolio securities based on the bank's ad-
vice. It is clear, therefore, that this purely advisory activity would
not contravene the Glass-Steagall Act. Furthermore, precautions could
be taken, in addition to those noted above, to insure against the abuses
enumerated in the /C/ decision.
One such precaution would be to limit the fund's investment pol-
icy to purchases of highly rated nonspeculative securities. Banks are
accustomed to this restriction because of the fiduciary responsibilities
89 Id. at 1464.
9° This agent could be a management company providing other management service,
including bookkeeping.
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already pervading their trust departments. Since the investment ex-
pertise of the trust department will form the basis of the advice given
to the investment company, it is likely that the recommendation of
highly rated securities will occur spontaneously.' As another precau-
tion, the fund should be prohibited from investing in securities for the
purpose of exercising control or management over the issuer or for the
purpose of participating in a takeover bid.° 2
 Furthermore, the majority
of the board of the investment company should not be comprised of
bank officers." This precaution will protect the fund against conflicts
between the bank's own interests and its advisory responsibilities. The
additional precautions suggested would minimize the risk of such con-
flicts occurring since these steps would prevent the bank from seeking
to obtain the banking business of a firm by acquiring control of it
through the mutual fund.
Although banks that provide investment advice to a mutual fund
without operating through a holding company are not subject to Reg-
ulation Y, they should exercise care to follow the limitations and pre-
cautions incorporated in the amendment and its interpretations. The
latter represent an arrangement that is likely to avoid the abuses
which the Glass-Steagall Act sought to remedy and which influenced
the outcome in /C/. For example, subsequent to the IC/ decision, the
Provident National Bank (Philadelphia, Pa.) decided to act as invest-
ment adviser to Independence Square Income Securities, Inc., a closed-
end, diversified management investment company. Eastman Dillon,
Union Securities & Co., and Loeb & Rhoades & Co. were underwriters
for the 1,700,000 share bond fund offered at $25 a share, for a total
of 42.5 million dollars." Although Regulation Y is not applicable be-
91 This situation would minimize the danger of the bank shoring up a company to
which the bank had loaned money by advising the fund to purchase stock of that com-
pany. It would also minimize the converse danger of the bank making imprudent loans
to a company in whose stock the bank had advised the fund to invest.
02 This prohibition would eliminate the danger of the bank advising the fund to
purchase stack in a company, the bank hoping thereby to obtain the commercial banking
business of that company.
93 In fact, unless the Federal Reserve Board is willing to modify its interpretation
of 4 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act and the "single-entity" doctrine promulgated there-
under, none of the investment company's employees could be bank employees. 12 C.F.R.
218.111 (1971). If the investment company and investment adviser are a single entity,
it would appear logical that 44 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act are once again violated.
Cf. Comment, Commingled Investment Fund, supra note 73, at 1302 n.148.
94 Prospectus, Independence Square Income Securities, Inc., Feb. 22, 1972, at 1.
There is no association of closed-end investment companies comparable to the ICI which
would have the incentive to challenge this arrangement. Apparently the ICI will not
challenge the plan. Duane Vieth, counsel for the ICI stated: "In our judgment, the most
serious of those conflicts of interest relate to this promotional aspect, this concern by the
bank or its affiliates in constantly selling the shares, and that, as I say, is not typical of
a closed-end company. So, I would have to be frank to say to you that the serious con-
flicts that we see are not present with respect to closed-end companies." Transcript of
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cause a bank, and not a bank holding company, will act as the fund
adviser, the Provident nonetheless intends to comply with the inter-
pretations and limitations of the amendment to Regulation Y. The
Provident has scrupulously avoided the potential hazards outlined in
ICI and, through its conservative selection of a closed-end fund, it has
avoided the primary evil of constant promotion. However, in light of
the rationale of /C/, it should make no difference whether the advised
fund is a bond or equity fund, open-end or closed-end." A bank
acting as investment adviser to either an open-end or a closed-end fund
does not violate the precise terms of the Glass-Steagall Act and, by
limiting its activity to an advisory role, the bank eliminates most of the
abuses set forth in /C/.
The difficulty with a bank acting as an investment adviser is a
practical one. If the bank advises a no-load open-end fund, who will
sell it? A bank cannot sell to its own depositors and a broker would
have no incentive to sell such a fund. At the same time, if a bank
advises an open-end load fund, the small investor's investment choices
are not expanded. It should be noted that the bank-advised closed-end
fund may be of little benefit to investors because the underwriting
commissions amount to approximately as much as the load charge im-
posed by the open-end mutual funds now available. Furthermore, most
closed-end funds sell at a discount from their net asset value. Initial
purchasers, although not subsequent purchasers, of a closed-end fund
may be penalized to the extent of the discount from net asset value
plus underwriting commissions. While the Provident had hoped that
its closed-end bond fund would sell on the basis of yield and, therefore,
without a discount, the fund shares initially sold at a discount of fif-
teen to twenty percent. The open-end, no-load fund is more beneficial
to investors because the purchaser is not subject to an underwriting
commission and shares are redeemable at net asset value. Perhaps if
banks demonstrate an ability to operate as advisers to mutual funds,
Hearings before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bank Holding
Companies to Serve as Investment Advisers to Investment Companies (Nov. 12, 1971)
at 15.
It should be noted that none of the directors of the investment company is an
employee of the Provident. Prospectus, Independence Square Income Securities, Inc.,
Feb. 22, 1972, at 6. However, the Senior Vice-President and Treasurer, and the Vice-
President and Secretary of the fund are also officers and employees of the Provident,
although they will serve the fund without compensation. Id. at 6-7. Because the fund
is a closed-end investment company, it may not be "primarily engaged" in the issuance or
distribution of securities, and, therefore, I 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act would not be
violated. An open-end fund, however, would be so engaged and, therefore no employee,
officer or director of an open-end fund can simultaneously be an employee, officer or
director of a national bank. 12 C.F.R. 218.101 (1971). See also note 28 supra.
95 See text at pp. 1182-83 supra.
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without abusing their position, Congress may be persuaded that, in
the public interest, new legislation should be passed permitting banks
to compete directly with mutual funds.
CONCLUSION
The role of banks operating in the field of mutual funds is pres-
ently in a period of rapid change. The Supreme Court's decision in
Investment Company Institute v. Camp held that First National City
Bank's collective investment fund violated the Glass-Steagall Act. Bar-
ring legislative change, employment of the commingled managing
agency account is no longer available to banks seeking to enter the
mutual fund field. The available approaches, therefore, are for banks
(1) to promote more actively their common trust funds, (2) to operate
no-load, closed-end funds, and (3) to act as investment advisers to
both open-end and closed-end funds. None of these alternatives pro-
vides the same benefit to small investors that the commingled agency
account does. However, successful employment of these approaches,
especially that entailing investment advisory activity, may serve as
the basis for legislative change. Certainly congressional endorsement
of the commingled agency account would benefit the small investor
to the greatest extent and would promote beneficial competition in the
field of mutual funds."
90 See Note, Commingled Investment Accounts: Bank v. Securities Industry, 45
Notre Dame Lawyer 746, 772 (1970).
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